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Abstract: 
Why scientists reach an agreement on new experimental methods when there are 
conflicts of interest about the evidence they yield?  I argue that debiasing methods play 
a crucial role in this consensus, providing a warrant about the impartiality of the 
outcome regarding the preferences of different parties involved in the experiment. From 
a contractarian perspective, I contend that an epistemic pre-requisite for scientists to 
agree on an experimental method is that this latter is neutral regarding their competing 
interests. I present two medical experiments (on smallpox inoculation and Mesmerism) 
in which debiasing procedures such as blinding and data tabulation provided warrants of 
impartiality that made people agree on the experimental design even if they disagreed 
on the outcome. 
 
HOW EXPERIMENTS BEGIN 
Most readers probably know well the controversy between philosophers, 
historians and sociologists on the closure of scientific experiments (e.g., Galison 1987). 
I am not going to focus here on the closing side of an experiment, but rather on its very 
beginning: the agreement on its design. Instead of wondering why certain experimental 
outcomes are accepted, I want to discuss why certain experimental methods prevail, 
even when there are controversies on the evidence they yield . In particular, when it is 
far from certain that these methods deliver the truth of the matter under study.  
More precisely, I want to discuss whether the impartiality of an experimental 
method plays any role in the acceptance of the setup. I will characterize experimental 
impartiality as follows: an experiment will be impartial if it incorporates 
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methodological devices preventing the experimenter from manipulating the results 
according to her interests, in the specific way each device addresses (Teira 2013a, 
2013c). Conscious or unconscious, such manipulations generate experimental biases: 
the preferences of the participants in the experiment interfere in the measurement 
process, altering the result that we would obtain if we replicated the experiment 
controlling for these preferences. When we detect such interferences, we declare the 
experimental data biased. I will consider an experiment impartial to the extent that it 
incorporates methods that control for the potential sources of bias –e.g., randomization 
for allocation bias, etc. Therefore, impartiality comes in degrees: the more complete it is 
our catalogue of potential biases and debiasing methods, the more impartial our 
experimental procedure will be.  
What these methods guarantee is that the experimental procedure will not be 
manipulated according to the interests of any of the competing parties. Hence, even if 
the implementation occasionally fails, in the long run these methods make more likely 
that the truth will emerge from successive replications of the experiment. In the short 
run, though, we often have no guarantee that an experiment will deliver the truth. 
Hence, truth by itself may not be enough to ground an agreement on a new experimental 
setup. Nonetheless, I contend that debiasing methods incorporated into such setup may 
contribute at this stage to make the design of the experiment acceptable, for a good 
epistemic reason. I will argue that impartiality is both a pre-requisite for any well-
grounded agreement among on methods competing scientists, and also an empirical 
feature of actual experimental designs that contributes to make them acceptable. 
The goal of this paper is to contribute some prima facie evidence for this set of 
claims about experimental impartiality from a contractarian standpoint (Zamora 2002). 
First, I am going to present and discuss two “constitutional” episodes in the history of 
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clinical trials. In both cases, a medical treatment was assessed in novel test where a new 
debiasing method was implemented for the first time. I want to show how this warrant 
of experimental impartiality played a practical role in the design and acceptance of these 
tests.  
In testing treatments we find almost by default a constitutive conflict of 
interests: patients and physicians usually have preferences for or against the treatment; 
the manufacturer wants it to succeed commercially, its competitors want the opposite. 
How should a test reconcile all these conflicting perspectives? I contend that the warrant 
of impartiality provided by our debiasing method contributes to make a practical 
agreement possible: the stakeholders in a clinical trial do not want their competing 
interest to influence the outcome, if they are to accept it as fair. From a theoretical 
standpoint this agreement would be a case in point of a major contractarian intutition: 
when scientists compete in testing their respective claims (theories, hypotheses, etc), a 
conceptual pre-requisite for making them agree on an empirical test is that such 
experiments should be neutral regarding their competing theories. I will defend that the 
same epistemic property that we characterize in our formal models of scientific 
agreement, contributes to actual empirical agreement on methods. 
The next two sections present two historical treatment tests in which I show, 
first, that there was an explicit concern for experimental impartiality; and second that 
the perceived neutrality of the methods implemented in the experiment could have 
contributed to make it acceptable and widely used. I am going to examine first how the 
tabulation of data was introduced in 18
th
 century Britain in order to debias the proto-
statistical analysis of a trial of inoculation against smallpox. Then I will discuss the 
introduction of blinding as a screening device in the causal analysis of the therapeutic 
effects of animal magnetism, in a series of experiments conducted in France before the 
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Revolution. The reader must bear in mind that my arguments are historically 
inconclusive. I just present a proof of concept: we can interpret these two episodes in the 
history of medical experimentation from an epistemic stance that does some justice to 
the actual interests of the agents involved.  
In the final section I will sketch a contractarian justification for the epistemic 
relevance of experimental impartiality. I will also illustrate with some experimental 
evidence why, as a matter of fact, this sort of impartiality makes more likely that we 
reach agreements.  
TABULATING INOCULATION DATA 
Between the XVII and the XVIII century, a series of outbreaks of smallpox 
made it the most feared disease in Britain. Unlike other plagues, both rich and poor 
suffered from the infection and this broad social concern may explain the public 
controversy over inoculation (Miller 1957, pp. 33-35). There were patients with 
financial means to buy a cure and there were not many: the best protection against the 
pox were quarantining the patients or fleeing whenever there was an outbreak (Miller 
1957, pp. 35-44). On the other hand, physicians were not always trusted as a profession: 
a patient often demanded “relief and freedom from pain, little considering about the 
causes of his illness” (Pender 2006, p. 10), causes about which physicians usually did 
not agree.  
When Lady Montagu introduced in London inoculation, a folk therapy she had 
come across in Turkey, a public debate over its efficacy started (Miller 1957, pp. 45-
133). It seemed indeed a counterintuitive treatment: inoculation put a patient at risk of 
contracting a disease she may never have had otherwise and die from it. To prove how 
much she trusted it, in 1721, Lady Montagu had her three-year-old daughter inoculated 
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and then persuaded the Princess of Wales to inoculate two of her daughters. Many more 
would follow after her. In the ensuing pamphlet war between supporters and critics of 
inoculation, the medical profession remained generally incredulous, if not openly 
critical. They had no theory to explain the purported efficacy of inoculation and they 
often found it objectionable for both ethical and theological reasons (Miller 1957, pp. 
100-110). The empirical part of the controversy hinged on the successful cases of 
inoculation reported, whether and under which circumstances they constituted a valid 
proof of the efficacy of the treatment.  
We find here one of the first quantitative assessments of a therapy drawing on 
data gathered to this purpose. The approach was so new that some initially disqualified 
as “some obscure and improper Calculations scarcely intelligible to any body, or if 
intelligible, altogether foreign to the Purpose” (Rusnock 2002, p. 68). Mathematics and 
medicine had then few, if any, intersection points and not many physicians could 
appreciate the weight of quantitative arguments. However, there was an informal 
understanding of how an adequate procedure of data recording could correct biased 
assessments of the success of a therapy. In my view, this understanding motivated the 
general acceptance of this new experimental method. 
Let us focus on the contribution of James Jurin (1684-1750), a physician and 
Newtonian natural philosopher who served as secretary of the Royal Society between 
1721 and 1727
1
. During his tenure, Jurin published a number of pamphlets defending 
inoculation with proto-statistical arguments (Rusnock 2002, pp. 55-63). He presented 
his method in the Letter to the learned Caleb Cotesworth (Jurin 1723): Jurin argued that 
a comparison of the figures in the Bills of mortality and the records of inoculated 
                                                            
1 See Jurin’s biography in Jurin 1996, pp. 8-61. John Arbuthnot contributed a similar estimate (Maitland 
& Arbuthnot 1722).  
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patients showed that the chances of dying from natural smallpox were bigger than those 
of dying after inoculation. 
Jurin studied the mortality figures for the periods in which smallpox deaths were 
counted separately (1667-1686 and 1701-1722) calculating that an average proportion 
of 1 in 14 deaths were due to the disease. Jurin corrected this estimation trying to take 
into account the high infant mortality caused by the pox and left it in a proportion of 1 
in 7 or 8 (Rusnock 2002, pp. 52-53). Jurin prepared another mortality table drawing on 
the data of several London inoculators during the years 1721 and 1722 and other 
available reports. He estimated a death ratio for inoculation of 1 of every 91 patients. 
Jurin was clear about the goal of his estimates: they were aimed at the British 
public at large addressing their concerns about smallpox treatments (Jurin 1723, p.7). But 
why would they be convinced by such figures? As the following citations illustrate, 
Jurin thought his method to be impartial:   
[I]f the following Extracts and Computations, concerning the comparative Danger of the 
Inoculated and Natural Small Pox, may be of any Use to your self or to other impartial 
and disinterested Judges, I shall think my Labour well bestowed. (1723, p. 4) 
And if someone suspects us of Partiality in proceeding after the manner we have done, 
he need only cast his Eyes upon the second Table (1723, p. 15) 
And many of his readers shared this view (see Rusnock 2002, pp. 66-68), among 
whom I should quote Jurin’s friend Thomas Nettleton: 
Your Pieces have been every where well received so far as I can learn, & the more 
because of the strict Neutrality you observe between the contending Partys. (Jurin 1996, 
pp. 304-305). 
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Appearing impartial was certainly necessary in a context where the financial 
interests of the advocates of inoculation seemed to be affecting their assessment of the 
treatment. My claim is that Jurin correctly saw the source of this impartiality in a 
controlled quantitative comparison, where the tabulation of the data prevented any 
ungrounded optimism in the assessment of the treatment’s efficacy. We owe to the 
remarkable Isaac Massey a very clear description of such biased optimism: 
I remember Mr. Maitland at Child’s Coffee-House, when this Practice was just begun at 
Newgate[2], was as confident and positive of the Success and Security proposed by it, as 
if he had had Twenty Years Experience without any Miscarriage, which made those 
who heard him justly suspect, he was more concerned for the Employ than the 
Successes of it […] (Massey 1723a, pp. 3-4) 
According to Massey, Maitland did not have the necessary evidential grounds (“twenty 
years of experience without miscarriage”) to support  his confidence in the therapy –this 
confidence probably originated elsewhere. But how could we estimate which type of evidence 
(and how much of it) corrected such undue optimism?  
Massey produced a subtle methodological pamphlet against inoculation, 
probably the best piece in this genre (Miller 1957, pp. 100-134). Massey’s arguments 
against inoculation targeted its purported causal mechanism that he considered 
grounded on a fallacious analogy: the effects of the inoculation are never uniform and 
depend on the particular circumstances of each patient (Massey 1723a, p. 8). He granted, 
however, that exposure to the disease may prevent it, if a properly chosen patient 
                                                            
2 Charles Maitland was a Scottish surgeon who had been Lady Montagu’s physician at the British 
embassy in Constantinople. He inoculated her daughter and became a leading advocate of the treatment 
(Miller 1957, pp. 71-72).  
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breathed in a contaminated environment. In order to rule out the efficacy of inoculation, 
Massey initially called for a controlled observation of its effects: 
[I] make one Request to the Royal College of Physicians; which is, that they would 
obtain Power from the Government (if they want it) to oblige every Person that shall 
hereafter be inoculated to have his Name, and Place of Abode, entered in a Register for 
that Purpose; wherein the Time and Successes, good or bad, should be also Registered, 
and if afterwards any should live to have the Small Pox, some Care should be taken 
effectually, that the College be acquainted therewith, and a Memorandum be made of it. 
(Massey 1723a, p. 21)  
He expected to achieve certainty in about 10 years. However, the publication of 
Jurin’s estimates came much earlier, and prompted a quick reaction. Massey published 
himself a letter questioning the methodology of Jurin’s comparison. He invoked an 
Aristotelian principle sometimes used among physicians
3
: comparanda non debent 
habere magnum inter se Differentiam (1723b, p. 4). Or, as Massey applies it to Jurin’s 
estimates: “To form a just Comparison, and calculate right in this Case, the 
Circumstances of the Patients, must and ought to be as near as may be on a Par” (1723b, 
p. 5). 
                                                            
3 At least, I found through Google Books the following trace: the Dutch physician Johannes Van der 
Linden (1609-1664) cites it in his Selecta medica (Leiden, Johannes Elsevirius, 1656, pp. 440-41) 
commenting on the fifth book of Hippocrates’ Epidemics. Van der Linden warned against comparing the 
resistance to disease of men and women invoking the authority of Aristotle’s Topics III, 1,116ª5-6: “The 
question which is the more desirable, or the better, of two or more things, should be examined upon the 
following lines: only first of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making concerns not 
things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great differences from one another.” (Trans. by W. A. 
Pickard)   
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Massey saw correctly that a proper comparison of mortality rates requires a fair 
principle of comparison in order to avoid what we would call today selection bias: 
[A]s for Instance, the Weakly, the Rickety, the Consumptive, the Scrophulous, the 
Asthmatick, and Surfeited Persons, such are all rejected by the Inoculators, as improper 
for that Operation, and also the Generality of Persons above Majority, and growing into 
Years (1723b, p. 5) 
Hence “the Inoculators” are comparing patients with a good standard of care 
with the general population, including here many poor patients without access to any 
treatment; moreover, there is no external check that those inoculated did really suffer 
from smallpox (Massey 1723b, p. 3). The comparison is biased and Massey ventured his 
own conjecture if his favourite treatment (breathing infectious air) was fairly compared 
to inoculation: 
That all Person of equal Ages, Healthiness and Condition of Life under equal Advice, 
Regimen and Nursing, taken ill of the Small Pox, either with or without Inoculation, the 
Difference in Success would be but little, yet not to the Advantage of the Inoculated 
(1723b, p. 14) 
In Massey we have indeed a clear understanding of the necessity of a controlled 
comparison. The controls instantiate in various forms the methodological principle of 
comparing like with like: tabulating data for age, baseline health, treatment, etc. secure 
proper evidential grounds for the assessment of the efficacy of treatments Such 
controlled comparisons would correct for the selection bias, whatever its sources (from 
financial conflicts of interest to patient selection). Tabulating patients taking into 
account the controlling factors made explicit whether the comparison was fair and 
warranted the impartiality of the assessment.  
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Nonetheless Massey seems to have been exceptional in his grasp of the 
comparative methodology
4
. In my view, Jurin was entitled to claim that his estimates 
were impartial, since the methodology guiding the construction of his mortality tables 
had been designed with a view to make the scope of the comparison explicit, rendering 
transparent to third party analysis any limitations due to subjective biases, whatever 
their source. And indeed there is evidence to think Jurin was reasoning along proto-
statistical principles in which tabulation was explicitly incorporated for bias correction. 
Andrea Rusnock (2002) points out that Jurin was drawing on the method of numerical 
tabulation articulated by John Graunt and William Petty. Their political arithmetic had 
been applied only a few decades before to the London Bills of mortality, providing the 
template for Jurin’s calculations. Graunt and Petty had found their own inspiration in 
Francis Bacon (Rusnock 2002, pp. 16-24), an early advocate of tabulating empirical 
evidence.  
Bacon’s tables were not quantitative and, among philosophers of science, they 
are usually considered as rough inferential tools. Historians of philosophy have pointed 
out, in turn, how Bacon took them as a proper “laboratory notebooks” aimed at 
“enhancing the mind’s capacity for reflection and minimizing its tendency to distortion” 
(Muntersbjorn 2003, p. 1138)
5
. Bacon proposed tabulation as a method to control the 
                                                            
4 According to Andrea Rusnock, “William Douglass, a physician in Boston, Massachusetts, raised similar 
concerns in his pamphlet Inoculation of the Small Pox as Practiced in Boston, Consider'd in a Letter to A 
- S - M.D. & F.R.S. in London (Boston: J. Franklin, 1722). Douglass argued that the surgeon Zabdiel 
Boylston had practiced inoculation indiscriminately on the old and young, strong and weak, and that any 
valid evaluation of the practice must first be made on the young and healthy with a careful record of the 
outcomes” (personal communication, September 28th 2010). However, Jurin did not reply in print or 
correspondence to any of them. 
5 See Rossi 1968, pp. 205-207 and Gaukroger 2001, pp. 118-127.  
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way our senses and memory deal with data: “the mind should not be left to itself, but be 
constantly controlled (perpetuo regatur); and the business done (if I may put it this 
way) by machines (per machinas)”6. Recording in writing every symptom observed 
during regular visits to a patient and then tabulating them would constitute a proper 
medical record allowing a Baconian physician to relate the nature of the disease, 
treatments and outcomes, without any subjective distortion (Pender 2006, p. 27).  
The impartiality of Jurin’s conclusions relied thus on the methodology he 
adopted for error correction: knowing that our interests could lead us to a selective 
treatment of evidence, adopting a thorough protocol for the tabulation of data would 
allow the experimenter –or her audience– to correct her personal equation and secure a 
comparison of like with like. In my view, Jurin was thus epistemically justified in his 
claim of impartiality, not because his experiment was actually free from biases, but 
because he explicitly tried to correct them adopting a method explicitly aimed at it
7
.  
In sum, Jurin contributed a new method for data analysis in medical 
experiments, the statistical comparison of epidemiological and experimental data. In 
order to ground this comparison, he tabulated these data justifying this method for its 
debiasing properties. In my terms, as a warrant of the impartiality of the analysis. In this 
regard, I think the controversy around the efficacy of inoculation shows an explicit 
concern for impartiality as a pre-requisite for finding the truth about treatments. This 
was my first claim. As to my second claim, we may wonder how persuasive this 
                                                            
6 F. Bacon. [1620] 2000. The New Organon. Edited and translated by Lisa Jardine and Michael 
Silverthore. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 28, discussed in Muntersbjorn 2002, p. 1145.  
7 Of course, under a different understanding of impartiality, this claim would not hold. See Teira 2013a, 
2013c for a more articulated version of my concept of impartiality 
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impartiality was, how much it contributed to the adoption of Jurin’s approach. About 
this we only have indirect evidence. 
For a start, it may have contributed to the adoption of inoculation in Britain, to 
the extent that his method helped in making explicit the actual efficacy of the treatment. 
Initially, it seems as if Jurin’s supporters were only in the Royal Society of London; the 
Royal College of Physicians, for instance, remained silent (Rusnock 2002, p. 44). But in 
the 1730s physicians had already admitted inoculation as a valid treatment, or at least it 
was mentioned favourably in nearly every English publication on the topic (Miller 
1957, p. 122, pp. 139-46). According to Rusnock (2002, p. 67) and Miller (1957, p. 
123), physicians writing 30 years after the publication of the 1723 pamphlet 
acknowledged his contribution to the acceptance of the therapy. Jurin’s estimates tested 
the toxicity of inoculation and as the number of treated patients increased, the figures 
became more and more convincing by themselves: 1 death per 500 treated patients by 
1765 (Boylston 2002). It was a therapy worth trying, even if there was no follow-up 
study to see for how long it protected the patient from contagion
8
.  
Of course, Jurin’s audience could not know whether his tabulation method had 
yielded a reasonably correct estimate just by chance. Apparently, Jurin’s claims of 
impartiality prevailed over Massey’s objections and his method was gradually adopted 
in Britain in the coming decades (Tröhler 2000). There are many possible 
interpretations of this process but, following Tröhler (2005), I submit that its debiasing 
properties contributed, as much as any other feature of Jurin’s method to its widespread 
acceptance. My claim, let us recall it, is not that impartiality per se explains the success 
of Jurin’s approach: it is rather that it played a role and, from a contractarian 
                                                            
8 For a study of the development of inoculation in Britain, see Brunton 1990.  
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perspective, this could be enough to interpret the adoption of Jurin’s method in 
epistemic terms.  
BLINDFOLDING MAGNETIZED PATIENTS 
Let us now address a different kind of bias in medical experiments, arising this 
time not from the experimenter but from the treated patient. The so-called placebo 
effect is not yet completely understood today, but two centuries ago was systematically 
appraised for the first time as a source of experimental error in testing therapies: we 
needed to separate the causal action of the treatment from the effect of the expectations 
of the patient about such treatment (the placebo)
9
. These expectations may bias a fair 
comparison between treatments if there is a systematic correlation between expectations 
and outcomes. Blinding patients as to the treatment they receive breaks this correlation, 
debiasing the comparison (Teira 2013b)  
Blindfolding patients for the administration of treatments was the debiasing 
method invented by the great chemist Antoine Lavoisier in order to test another publicly 
controversial therapy seeking official recognition in the prerevolutionary France: animal 
magnetism, also known as Mesmerism. Originally conceived by Franz Anton Mesmer 
(1734 –1815), a graduate from the Faculty of Medicine in Vienna (1776), it was based 
on the principle that every disease originated in an imbalance of a universal fluid, that 
                                                            
9 I identify here the placebo effect with the expectations of the patients, since only these latter would 
explain why patients improve –and not any active principle in the treatment they receive. This is too gross 
a simplification, since, on the one hand, most placebo effects can be explained otherwise (e.g., regression 
to the mean); and, on the other hand, when we observe it, there may be more than expectations at work –
see Miller et al. (2013) for a discussion. For my case though, the simplification seems acceptable, since 
the patients expectations were the source of improvement that Lavoisier wanted to control 
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Mesmer claimed could be controlled and restored to equilibrium by some sort of 
magnetism. Mesmer arrived in Paris in 1778. Due to the reputation acquired in his first 
magnetic venture in Vienna, Mesmer’s Parisian clinic soon became very popular among 
the French élite (Gillispie 1980). Mesmer probably took himself (or at least, many of his 
patients and supporters took him) for some sort of scientist and, when his therapy was 
questioned, Mesmer sought official acknowledgement of animal magnetism by three 
scientific bodies.  
The most successful attempt to get recognition was due to Charles Deslon, a 
member of the Faculty of Medicine and physician-in-ordinary to the comte d’Artois, 
who became one of Mesmer’s first Parisian disciples. Deslon presented animal 
magnetism to his colleagues, made some of them attend Mesmer’s clinic and in 1780 he 
formally proposed to the Faculty’s assembly the conduct of a clinical trial. His sceptical 
colleagues declined the offer. Mesmer took this badly, threatened to leave France and 
got an immediate offer on behalf of the king: if a government commission favourably 
assessed his therapy, he would receive a generous pension and the facilities to create an 
Institute for Animal Magnetism.  
The public success of mesmerism in the pre-revolutionary France can be partly 
explained if we consider, on the one hand, that Mesmer was challenging the authority of 
the Church: his animal magnetism would provide a natural explanation of phenomena 
so far considered extraordinary. On the other hand, the scientific bodies that dismissed 
his applications appeared to many as illegitimate monopolies on the authority of 
science, putting it at the service of the Crown (Darnton 1968). This is probably why, in 
1784, the Baron de Breteuil, Minister of the King's Household (secretary of state), 
decided to form a commission in order to examine the claims of Mesmer and eventually 
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discredit them
10
. Lavoisier made a more general case: if Mesmer was right, everyone 
could potentially cure using magnetism, subverting thus the institutional organization of 
medicine in a way a government cannot ignore for its potential consequences for its 
citizens (Lavoisier 1865, pp. 514-515; Franklin et al. 1784b). Here we find an argument 
that will reappear time and again in the coming decades, ultimately leading to the 
creation of State agencies overseeing the pharmaceutical market. 
 One way or another, the interests in conflict around Mesmerism were so big that 
the commission needed to appear impartial in order to be credible. But, as a matter of 
fact, both Lavoisier and Franklin, the most distinguished scientists in the commission, 
were incredulous even before the actual inquiry started. Franklin had met Mesmer 
already in 1779 and was never convinced by his therapeutic claims, perhaps because of 
his own trials with electricity in various types of paralysis (never with lasting effects), 
perhaps because he was well aware of how we misinterpret spontaneous remission: 
“there being so many Disorders which cure themselves and such a Disposition in 
Mankind to deceive themselves and one another on these Occasions” (Smyth 1905, p. 
183). Lavoisier shared this view: since it is difficult to tell apart the influence of the 
treatment from all other factors, we need to accumulate data on the effects of the former 
in order to make a probabilistic assessment. (Lavoisier 1865, p. 599)  
                                                            
10 Actually there were two commissions, since another one was arranged at the Society of Medicine. We 
will just pay attention to the first one, chaired by Franklin, where the blinding procedure was originally 
employed. We will draw on these original sources: their report (Franklin et al. 1784a), the summary of the 
report presented at the Academy of Sciences (Franklin et al. 1784b), the various manuscripts prepared by 
Lavoisier on the topic collected in his Memoir sur le magnétisme animal (Lavoisier 1865) and Deslon’s 
(1784) reply to the report.  
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After reading summaries of Mesmer’s doctrine, Lavoisier conjectured, as some 
others had done before him (Lavoisier 1865, p. 505), that what he called the patient’s 
“imagination” might explain the immediate effects of the therapy and planned several 
experiments in order to test this possibility.  
The commission, in which there were three physicians together with Lavoisier 
and Franklin, was formally summoned in April 1784 by the Baron of Breteuil and spent 
the next four months conducting experiments in Paris with the assistance of the 
aforementioned Charles Deslon, who had quarrelled with Mesmer and established an 
independent clinic in 1781. Right in the acceptance letter to Breteuil, the commission 
announced that they would not judge the therapeutic effects of animal magnetism, since 
they could not expect to gather enough data to reach a firm conclusion (Lavoisier 1865, 
p. 500).  
The commission was going to assess instead whether animal magnetism had any 
physical reality, under the principle that it “can exist without being useful, but it cannot 
be useful if it does not exist” (Franklin et al. 1784b, p. 8). However, they acknowledged 
that the only empirical effects discernible were those manifested in patients undergoing 
magnetic therapy. Namely, convulsions and minor sensations (such as warmth or 
coldness) following minimal intervention from the magnetizer (light touches, signs, 
gestures). The experiments focused on these effects, trying to isolate their purported 
causes. Here is where the innovative design came to set a standard for further research. 
Lavoisier’s assumption in designing the inquiry was that the causes could be 
either physical (like animal magnetism) or “moral” (1865, p. 510). He knew how to 
proceed with the former, and just a series of preliminary observations in about 14 
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patients convinced the commission that they had no discernible effect
11
. Yet, there was 
no previous scientific research about the physical effects of moral causes (Franklin et al. 
1784b, p. 11). Nonetheless, Lavoisier drew on his laboratory experience in chemistry, 
decomposing and recomposing substances (Franklin et al. 1784b, p. 10):  the test of animal 
magnetism would “analyze” the physical and moral causes, pretending that both are 
acting, when only one of them actually does. The “synthesis” of the convulsions in each 
case would prove the success of the analysis (Lavoisier 1865, p. 510). In order to make 
this experimental setup work uncontaminated by the preferences of the patients, 
Lavoisier came up with a brilliant debiasing method: blindfolding them. Predictably, 
when the experiment was actually carried out, there were blinded patients who suffered 
convulsive crisis when they were told they were being magnetized (and they were not) 
and remained calm when they were in fact magnetized but nobody told them
12
. 
The commission tried to explain the psychological and physiological 
mechanisms at play in the convulsions (Franklin et al. 1784a, pp. 48-63). As to the 
former, they claimed that imagination alone or combined with the effects of touching 
and imitation accounted for the immediate effects of the therapy, but they just illustrated 
these mechanisms with various examples, without formal definitions. The physiological 
mechanisms explaining the convulsions were discussed in order to assess their potential 
effects on the patient’s health: the Commission warned these could be negative and 
advised to proscribe magnetic therapies. 
                                                            
11 The way the commission selected the patients and dismissed their testimonies was the major source of 
objections against the report, since it often presupposed the hypothesis that Lavoisier sought to test: the 
patients were under the influence of the experimenter’s expectations: see Lynn and Lilienfeld 2002. 
12 For the actual report of the experiments, see Franklin et al. 1784a, pp 31-48. The plan is laid out in 
Lavoisier 1865, pp. 511-513. 
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Of course, the commission was later criticized on both accounts, since their 
conjectures were unsupported by the available evidence (in their experiments or 
elsewhere). But leaving these objections aside, what earned the Commission a place in 
the History of clinical trials was their finding that there were psychological mechanisms 
at play by which a doctor could act on a patient, causing physical effects that distorted 
the tests of a purportedly physical therapy (Franklin et al. 1784b, p. 15). Even if the 
precise articulation of these mechanisms was unknown, the Commission put forward a 
comparative design in which the action of these mechanisms was separated, securing it 
with blindfolding as a debiasing method. 
Unlike with Jurin’s tabulation method we do not find an explicit concern for 
impartiality in the texts of Lavoisier. However, if we recall my definition of 
experimental impartiality, this is what his method brought about: blindfolding was 
indeed a methodological device preventing the experimenter (and the patient) from 
manipulating the results according to her interests. Lavoisier was perfectly aware of 
how the imagination of the patients could be manipulated to create the illusion of a cure: 
blindfolding patients prevented the mesmerist from interacting directly with them, 
breaking off any systematic connection between the interests of the therapist and the 
expectations of patients. 
Unlike with Jurin, we find here a clear acknowledgement of the epistemic 
virtues of blindfolding independently of the quality of the outcome of the experiment. 
The conclusions of the Commission prompted controversy, since the interests in favour 
of Mesmerism were big, and its supporters immediately contested it. In my view, it is 
remarkable that the debiasing properties of blindfolding were rarely contested in the 
pamphlet war that followed the publication of the Commission’s report –20.000 copies 
were sold of this latter alone.  
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Magnetic therapy was cultivated in France for several more decades, prompting 
the conduct of new experiments in order to grasp its efficacy
13
. Very few of these latter 
questioned the necessity of blindfolding the patients, since their expectations regarding 
the therapy could bias the results of the experiment: Deslon himself seems to have 
admitted it, according to the report –he tried later to qualify his admission though 
(Franklin et al. 1784, p. 60). What the Mesmerists questioned was that the patients’ 
“imagination” alone could explain the healing of so many patients treated with animal 
magnetism. In the pamphlets the possibility of a spontaneous remission was rarely 
considered, partly because the recovery rate of magnetotherapy did not seem inferior to 
many other legitimate medical treatments. Hence, the Mesmerists claimed the 
Commission should have conducted experiments with patients who were naturally 
blinded and had yet recovered
14
.  
The Commission was accused, of course, of professional bias by the way they 
designed the experiment
15
. In any case, the principle that trials of animal magnetism 
should be blinded was rarely questioned. As Ted Kaptchuk (1998, p. 397) puts it: 
Debunkers and advocates alike quickly adopted the new blind assessment method to 
prove their points of view, and it became intrinsic to the entire controversy surrounding 
the nineteenth-century medical and extramedical mesmeric movement. In cloistered 
academic laboratories and on stages before hundreds, magnetic healers and itinerant 
entertainers were challenged to cure, detect, or perform wondrous feats with 
                                                            
13 For a survey of ensuing research on Mesmerism, see Bertrand 1826 and Burdin and Du Bois 1841. The 
main arguments of the pamphlet war are summarized in Pattie 1994.  
14 The clearest presentation of these arguments I found is Servan 1784. See pp. 109-111 for an alternative 
plan for the inquiry. 
15See, e.g. M. G. C*** 1784, pp. 13-14. 
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practitioners and/or subjects blindfolded. A cottage industry of blind assessment 
developed. 
I suggest interpreting this general acceptance of blinding as an acknowledgment 
of the necessity of an impartial trial. After all, the supporters of Mesmerism might have 
contested this debiasing method, arguing –as many others did later– that the perceived 
effects of the therapy were part of the treatment. Lavoisier’s approach prevented the 
preferences of patients and therapists from having an influence on the trial outcome, 
making the experiment more credible than it otherwise had been.  
As a reviewer observes though, it is true that, despite being a relatively old 
technique, blinding has been very unevenly used by experimenters across disciplines
16
. 
This would imply that the concern for experimental impartiality is not as wide as we 
would like to think. This may be true: my claim so far is that impartiality becomes a 
prominent concern only when we have big conflicts of interest at stake in a trial that 
prevent parties from reaching an easy agreement on its outcome. Paradigmatically this 
is the case of medical experiments, where, for instance, patients are often willing (or 
not) to use treatments disregarding significant pieces of evidence about their actual 
effects. Of course, impartiality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for an 
actual agreement on an experimental outcome. What I claim is that, from an epistemic 
standpoint, such a consensus is more justified when there are underlying warrants of 
impartiality such as the debiasing procedures we have been discussing. We will try to 
motivate this further in the conclusion. 
                                                            
16 As to the former, blinding was already used for the test of exorcisms in the 16th century: see Kaptchuk 
et al. 2009. For the sometimes poor understanding of the virtues of blinding among experimenters, see, 
for instance, the discussion of the predesignation rules among experimental physicists in Staley 2002 
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IS THERE A GENERAL CONCERN FOR EXPERIMENTAL IMPARTIALITY? 
The two case studies present prima facie evidence for two claims. On the one 
hand, in controversial experiments, there is an explicit concern for debiasing methods as 
warrants of the impartiality of the outcome. On the other hand, these methods contribute 
to close the controversy on the hypotheses tested. From a philosophical standpoint, 
there is a simple interpretation of both cases: in comparative experiments, such as 
clinical trials in medicine, a bias is just a confounding factor breaking the causal parity 
of both groups (regarding every other factor but the treatments administered). This is a 
perfectly valid interpretation, since this is an actual contribution of any debiasing 
method. I want to supplement it with a different approach, focusing on why these 
methods were widely adopted.  
From most philosophers of science, a simple concern for truth is enough to 
explain it, since experimenters would be just truth seekers and debiasing methods 
contribute to this search. But historians and sociologists have shown that in experiments 
such as those discussed in the previous sections, there is no general agreement on what 
counts as a confounding factor, since the mechanisms underlying each treatment were 
not clear themselves –see, e.g., Collins and Pinch (2005), pp. 84-110. The truth about 
each therapy only emerged in the long run, after the evidence accumulated. But this 
accumulation was only possible because there was, at least, an agreement on the 
methods for gathering evidence. So how and why did scientists reach this consensus? 
I contend that, from an epistemic standpoint, this agreement can be interpreted 
as grounded on the impartiality of the experiment, warranted by the introduction of 
debiasing methods such as tabulation or blinding. After all, scientists may disagree on 
the unknown confounding factors in an experiment, but they usually acknowledge that 
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their own interests are a known confounder that should be controlled for. We can 
vindicate thus the Baconian intuitions behind Jurin’s tabulation method. Debiasing 
methods guaranteed that the outcome of the test was not contaminated by the 
preferences of the experimenters (or any other participant in the experiment). This is 
what Lavoisier achieved blindfolding the patients. Despite the controversy on the 
effectiveness of the therapies, both debiasing procedures (tabulation and blinding) were 
widely adopted by the contending parties. And, in my view, they were epistemically 
justified in such consensus on experimental methods.  
The epistemic relevance of controlling for these preferences can be defended 
from a contractarian perspective (Zamora Bonilla 2002), as I have tried to argue 
elsewhere (Teira 2013a). The core intuitition of this approach is as follows: Let us 
imagine a community of self-interested scientists, partly motivated by finding truths, 
and partly by more mundane interests such as, for instance, the success of their careers. 
They are in competition with each other for achieving this success, so when they test 
their respective claims (theories, hypotheses, etc.), they have every incentive to contest 
each other’s outcomes. In a winner-takes-it-all scenario, the success of one of these 
scientists may imply the failure of the rest of them, so they can prevent it by rejecting as 
flawed everybody else´s tests. However, if none of them accepts each other’s outcomes, 
there will be no winner in the race for success: A researcher seeking to increase her 
professional accomplishments can only succeed if her peers accept her results.  
From a contractarian standpoint, even if every member of this community of 
self-interested scientists has an incentive to promote the experimental methods most 
favorable to her own theory, they need to agree on a set of shared testing standards, so 
that at least one of the competing parties can win. A pre-requisite for the shared 
acceptance of any of these testing standards is that they are impartial in the sense 
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discussed above: they should incorporate methodological devices preventing the 
experimenter from manipulating the results according to her interests, not giving anyone 
a better chance of finding the result they are after.  
This intuition can be substantiated in a formal economic model of scientific 
agreement (e.g., Ferreira and Zamora Bonilla 2006), showing under which range of 
circumstances this latter is possible. If we accept a characterization of scientists as self-
interested agents maximizing a utility function, striking a trade-off between truth and 
social scuccess, experimental impartiality will be a pre-requisite for their agreement on 
a testing standard, and the subsequent experimental results. In the two cases studies 
presented above we saw how the concern for debiasing methods was rooted in a 
combination of epistemic and practical interests. Physicians cared about the true effect 
of a treatment, but they were also concerned by the money they could make or lose 
depending on the outcome of a trial. Debiasing methods provided a warrant of 
impartiality that, I submit, would contribute to close any controversy on the test of a 
treatment: if we accept ex ante the fairness of statistical tabulations or blinding devices, 
we should not contest as biased, ex post, the experimental outcome. We have developed 
this argument in a systematic fashion elsewhere –see  Teira 2013a,b. 
However, from an empirical standpoint, and in order to persuade historians and 
sociologists, we need some evidence that the agents involved in actual experiments have 
this taste for impartiality presupposed in our contractarian epistemology. We want to 
close this paper showing that there is as well prima facie evidence for such a taste, at 
least if we accept an analogy between experiments and fair decision procedures.  As we 
have seen in the previous two sections, medical experiments are generally perceived by 
all the concerned parties as a decision procedure on the efficacy of a therapy. This 
efficacy is usually disputed and, ideally, the experiment should end the controversy and 
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make us agree. However, the agreement involves different costs and benefits for the 
concerned parties: for instance, the producer of the therapy (or his competitors) may 
earn or lose the money patients will be willing to pay for it. As the two cases presented 
illustrate, the concerned parties tend to accuse each of other of partiality: their personal 
interests in the outcome of the experiment may bias it as a decision procedure, making 
it unfair. 
When it comes to distributing costs and benefits in any context, the perceived 
fairness of our decision procedure seems to contribute to the acceptance of the outcome 
when it is adverse to our interests. To the extent that scientists compete, there are 
winners and losers in every experiment and the implementation of debiasing procedures 
will increase the perceived fairness of the test, making its outcome more palatable to 
those who lose. Psychologists have been studying throughout the last four decades the 
individual reactions to the fairness of a third party decision. The general approach 
implemented in many different experimental settings, from the field to the laboratory, 
assumed that each decision follows some sort of procedure and generates an outcome 
for the participant whose reaction is studied. The experiments usually aim at 
disentangling how this reaction depends on the perceived justice of the procedure, on 
the one hand, and the perceived justice of the outcome, on the other hand.  
The following generalizations seem to hold (I quote from Brockner and 
Wisenfeld 1996, p. 191):  
 When outcomes are unfair or have a negative valence (e.g., losses), procedural 
justice is more likely to have a direct effect on individuals’ reactions 
 When procedural justice is relatively low, outcome favourability is more apt to 
be positively correlated with individuals’ reactions 
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 The combination of low procedural fairness and low outcome favourability 
engenders particularly negative reactions 
I conjecture that debiasing procedures operate in this same manner inside and 
outside scientific experiments, and this is why they contribute to make the outcome of 
controversial tests more acceptable. Think, for instance, of randomization: in 
comparative experiments, a randomized allocation of treatments prevents the 
experimenter from distributing them according to her own preferences. It is a warrant of 
impartiality. But a randomized allocation is just a fair lottery, where, for instance, every 
patient in a trial has the same probability of receiving any of the treatments under 
analysis. We have experimental evidence that randomization, as a decision procedure, 
increases the perceived fairness of any distribution process. 
Consider now this economic experiment conducted by Bolton and co-authors 
(2005). It is an Ultimatum game in which one of the participants (the proposer) must 
choose how to share a given amount of money and the other participant (the responder) 
must accept (a) or reject (r) the offer. For instance, the proposer splits 2000 units, 
keeping 1800 for himself and 200 for the responder: if the latter accepts (a) this is what 
they have; if he rejects it (r), they both receive 0. Bolton and his co-authors arranged a 
randomized ultimatum in which a random draw decided which of the three splits was 
offered to the responder, with three different probability assignments (figure 1)   
Figure 1: Ultimatum game (Bolton et al. 2005) 
In ASYM the dice are loaded for the most favourable payoff to the proposer 
(proposal C). In SYM98, the loaded proposal is the equal (fair) payoff. In SYM34 the 
three payoffs are almost equiprobable. Bolton et al. (2005, p. 1065) observed that the 
fair lottery (SYM34) prompted the responder to accept an unfair offer (1800-200) just 
as often as in SYM98, where the fair split (1000-1000) is probabilistically loaded 
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(0,98). The unfair offer (1800-200) was rejected significantly more often in ASYM than 
in SYM34: when the dice are loaded for an unfair distribution, we don’t find it as 
acceptable as when the lottery is fair. 
If the analogy between experiments and distribution processes holds, 
randomization not only guarantees the impartiality of an experiment, making the 
outcome neutral regarding the interests at stake; it makes the costs involved in this 
outcome more acceptable for those who lose (e.g., scientists who see their hypotheses 
fail). If there is indeed an empirical preference for impartial decision procedures, this is 
a lever to apply the contractarian approach to actual episodes of controversy about 
experimental design, such as those discussed in the previous sections. Philosophers of 
science might see this as just another instance of old epistemic rationality prevailing in 
real life. Historians and sociologists may be persuaded instead because, in our 
contractarian approach, we do not presuppose much rationality: scientists seeking their 
own interest with a moderate taste for fairness in the distribution of actual costs may 
reach methodological agreements such as those we observe in real life. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have seen two historical illustrations of experiments about medical 
treatments in which, despite serious conflicts of interests between the concerned parties, 
they reached an agreement about the debiasing methods implemented in the tests. 
Tabulating data about smallpox inoculation allowed the experimenter to monitor the 
factors influencing the comparative efficacy of the treatment and allowed his audience 
to check whether such comparisons were fair. Blindfolding patients in the Mesmerism 
trials allowed the experimenter to control for their expectations and tear them apart from 
the actual treatment effect.  
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In both cases there was no clear understanding of the biases that could interfere 
with the test, but the debiasing methods implemented seemed to convinced the 
concerned parties that the experiment had been impartial enough. These methods 
provided a warrant about the non-manipulability of the evidence according to anyone’s 
preferences. If the experimenter commits himself to tabulate his experimental data or 
have his subjects blindfolded, he loses freedom to fiddle with the test in his own 
interest. From a contractarian perspective, we can vindicate this understanding of  
impartiality as non-manipulability as an epistemic pre-requirement for reaching a 
scientific consensus on any experimental method. There is evidence to think that this 
preference for debiasing procedures as warrants of fairness actually plays a role in our 
actual decision-making. Hence, from a contractarian approach we can make sense of the 
epistemic impact of debiasing methods in the history of clinical trials.  
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